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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a status report on the 
study of a next-generation manned launch 
system, or Shuttle II, being conducted at the 
NASA Langley Research Center. Underlying 
reasons for considering such a system, 
including the need for low-cost, safe, and 
reliable manned access to space, are 
discussed. System and operational 
characteristics for such a future vehicle are 
presented. Several rocket vehicle conceptual 
designs are depicted that satisfy the stated 
requirements. The role of advancing 
technologies is shown to have a major impact 
on the choice of a vehicle concept. For a 
near-term technology level, a two-stage rocket 
vehicle has been selected for in-depth Shuttle 
II studies. The need for fully-reusable 
launch systems with radically simpler ground 
and flight operations is stated to be critical 
in reducing launch costs. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Space Shuttle represents a major 
advancement in the space transportation 
capabilities of the United States. Despite 
the Challenger accident, the Space Shuttle 
has, over many missions, demonstrated itself 
~c::t- be a highly versatile vehicle for both 
planned and unplanned mission activities. 
However, one original goal of the Space 
Shuttle system has remained elusive--that of 
low-cost space transportation. Because of 
budgetary pressures in the development phase, 
early fully-reusable Shuttle concepts evolved 
into the more labor-intensive partially 
reusable system actually produced. As a 
result, recurring hardware and operations 
costs have proven far higher than expected. 
Recent civilian and military space launch 
requirements studies (ref. 1 ,2) and the report 
of the National Commission on Space (ref. 3) 
have presented exciting and ambitious options 
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for expanding man's activities into the space 
frontiers over the next several decades. 
Included in these forecasts are manned 
geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) missions, 
lunar and Mars bases, and deployment of large 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) systems. 
Attaining such goals will require that space 
transportation costs drop to levels far below 
those of the present Space Shuttle system or 
expendable launch vehicles. Otherwise, 
mission planners will be faced with scaling 
back activities to stay within anticipated 
budget constraints. 
Routine, low-cost access to space is a 
compelling enough reason for considering a 
next-generation space transportation system. 
But it is not the only one. Projected demands 
for Space Shuttle launch services will impose 
maximum allowable flight rates on the system. 
Sometime in the post-2000 era, individual 
Shuttle vehicles will face wearout and 
retirement. The dramatic technological 
progress which has occurred in many areas 
since the development and deployment of the 
Space Shuttle suggests that a new, more 
efficient space transportation system replace 
the current system. International competition 
is also growing in the marketplace in response 
to rising launch demands, with many new 
transportation systems under study or 
development by the Europeans, Japanese, 
Chinese, and Soviets. Pressures are building 
on the U.S. to face this market competition 
with its own launch systems. 
The Langley Research Center has for many years 
been actively involved in examining new space 
transportation system concepts to fulfill a 
variety of anticipated mission needs (ref. 4, 
5). Early in 1985, Langley was asked by NASA 
Headquarters to initiate preliminary 
conceptual studies of a next-generation launch 
system called "Shuttle II". Early study 
phases were aimed at defining desired system 
and operational characteristics of a Shuttle 
II system. A main objective of the Shuttle II 
program is to demonstrate vehicle concepts 
that (a) substantially reduce the cost of 
space transportation and (b) provide a 
complement to a transportation architecture 
that supports a wide range of scientific, 
defense, and commercial uses. Progress 
reports on this study have appeared earlier in 
references 6 and 7. 
MISSIONS AND TRANSPORTATION ARCHITECTURE 
Planning for a next-generation space 
transportation system requires detailed views 
of anticipated future space activities. 
Mission models for the period 1992-2010 are 
available (ref. 1 ,2) for such purposes. 
Generally, anticipated missions tend to fall 
within two categories. On one hand there is a 
need to move large masses--bulk cargo, 
propellants, large military and civilian 
satellites--to orbit at the lowest possible 
cost or "low dollars per pound". But for 
priority or sortie types of missions involving 
personnel transport, servicing and repair 
visits, and movement to orbit and return of 
high-valued commercial products and supplies. 
a low 11 dollars per flight" approach is a valid 
consideration. 
As Figure 1 shows, the Space Shuttle was 
designed to perform all these space 
transportation functions. The Challenger 
accident placed new emphasis on assured access 
to space with complementary launch systems 
emerging such as the Air Force Titan 4 among 
other expendables. In the future, however, a 
mixed-fleet approach will divide these 
functions in a more cost-efficient manner. A 
Shuttle II vehicle would fly the priority/ 
sortie missions. Near-term technology dictates 
an all-rocket system, but given time and 
technology funding, an air-breathing system, 
such as the National Aero-Space Plane, may 
emerge as a Shuttle II option. The Langley 
Shuttle II study is limited to vertical 
takeoff rocket systems. The heavy-lift 
functions may be fulfilled initially through 
the use of a Shuttle-Derived Vehicle (SDV) 
using many of the same components, facilities, 
and manpower of the present Space Shuttle 
system. Later, more cost-efficient partially-
reusable or fully-reusable launch vehicles may 
be phased in to meet anticipated increased 
launch demands. 
Total life-cycle costs (the sum of 
development, production, and recurring costs) 
for these systems will, no doubt, greatly 
influence the timing and appearance of the 
particular mixed-fleet systems developed. To 
lower total life~cycle costs, the two vehicles 
may share common launch sites, operational 
facilities, and manpower. And in the "common 
element" approach to vehicle architecture, 
major launch components may also be shared 
between vehicles as indicated by the dashed 
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line connecting the mixed-fleet approaches in 
Figure 1 . An example is a first-stage booster 
used in conjunction with either a manned 
orbiter element or an unmanned heavy-lift 
stage. 
The present study has placed primary Shuttle 
II mission emphasis into the three major 
categories as shown in Figure 2. The 
personnel transport role assumes ever-
increasing emphasis a& the Space Station 
begins operations and~'undergoes growth. On-
orbi t servicing is another major role 
undertaken by Shuttle II. Not only will there 
be a Space Station in orbit, there will also 
be many unmanned space platforms and 
observatories which will require periodic 
maintenance and repair--a task well-suited for 
a manned launch vehicle. Space Shuttle crews 
have aptly demonstrated these tasks in earlier 
missions. In many mixed-fleet approaches, the 
heavy-lift vehicle functions only to take 
payloads to orbit. But there is also a need 
to bring much of this payload mass back from 
orbit. This is especially true of high-valued 
products manufactured in orbit--for example, 
pharmaceuticals and crystals--as well as Space. 
Station logistics modules and materials. A 
manned Shuttle II also fulfills this role. 
While the payload requirements of a Shuttle II 
system have not been set, certain "driver" or 
baseline missions are being used in this 
study. These include 20,000 pounds to a Space 
Station operations orbit (262 nautical miles, 
28.5 degrees inclination), and 12,000 pounds 
to a low sun-synchronous orbit (150 nautical 
miles, 98.0 degrees inclination) for servicing 
of unmanned polar platforms. The baseline 
payload bay size is a 15-foot diameter 
cylindrical volume 30-feet in length. It 
should be emphasized that these are only 
representative study missions. The Shuttle II 
study is examining vehicle design sensitivity 
to reference mission payloads ranging from 
2,500 to 65,000 pounds. 
SYSTEM AND OPERATIONS REQUIREMENTS 
Understanding the costs of the Space Shuttle 
system is a key consideration in evaluating 
design options for a replacement system. 
Figure 3 examines one aspect--the costs 
associated with flying Shuttle missions. 
Presently, large costs are incurred in both 
the manpower for ground, flight, and 
management o·perations and the replacement and 
refurbishment of Shuttle hardware. Propellant 
costs for each flight are a relatively small 
percentage of the total. 
In the future, the need is to reduce launch 
costs by a large f actor--some say an order-of-
magni tude reduction. The costs of propellants 
for a vertical-takeoff rocket system will not 
change very much. What this implies is the 
need for a radically new approach to 
operations concepts, making all Shuttle II 
system components fully reusable, and flying 
the vehicle frequently to amortize the 
facility and manpower costs. These are very 
difficult objectives. In our study we have 
sought to define desired operational and 
vehicle characteristics which would lead us 
closer to the goal of major cost reductions. 
Briefly, we foresee a vehicle which need not 
have all the capabilities of the present Space 
Shuttle. Crew size for Shuttle II would be 
limited--two to five depending on mission 
type. Maximum duration would be shortened to 
three days, but the Shuttle II vehicle would 
operate frequently (fly every two weeks) with 
a minimum of maintenance and checkout 
requirements bet.ween flights and operate under 
adverse weather conditions--rain and moderate 
winds included. Safety is a major concern. 
The Shuttle II vehicle will possess large 
performance margins, fault-tolerant 
subsystems, and abort capabilities. For 
example, the vehicle will be able to reach 
orbit even if one engine were to fail at 
liftoff. Under worst-case conditions, where 
vehicl~ recovery was not possible, the Shuttle 
II would have an escape system to permit crew 
survival. 
Innovative design and improved technologies 
are needed to reduce the operations labor 
force. Major assembly and processing would be 
conducted horizontally in low-bay work 
facilities. Vehicle/payload integration is an 
area which, in particular, lends itself to 
significant processing streamlining. Under 
present Space Shuttle procedures, an orbiter 
will sit in a processing facility while the 
entire cargo bay is reconfigured, interface 
tests run, and orbiter software changed and 
verified for each new mission. The Shuttle II 
concept decouples the vehicle and payload 
processing and minimizes the interface 
requirements as depicted in figure 4. Payload 
containment structures may be standardized for 
major mission types thus eliminating the need 
for major reconfiguration after each flight. 
Installation of the container on a vehicle 
would take place in the processing facility 
with only minimum payload access availability 
at the launch pad. The use of tip fins on the 
vehicle wing eliminates the need for a large 
vertical tail and frees fuselage area for the 
payload canister concept. 
The vehicle should also. possess an 
automated,self-diagnostic checkout system with 
built-in test equipment and modularized 
subsytems for easy maintenance to speed 
·processing between flights. And, by making 
the vehicle as autonomous as possible with 
.extensive use of standardized flight software, 
robotics, and artificial intelligence, many 
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functions of a labor-intensive mission control 
can be eliminated. 
An analogy frequently drawn is that of launch 
vehicle operations similar in scope to airline 
operations whereby a small ground crew 
services and readies an airliner for the next 
flight, which is then flown in nearly an 
qutonomous mode by a small.flight crew. 
Launch vehicles, however, have not yet reached 
a state of maturity where such routineness is 
likely even in a next-generation system. 
Lessons learned from Space Shuttle operations, 
however, certainly point the way to changes in 
design and operations that would provide a 
closer realization of that goal. 
TECHNOLOGY ISSUES 
The role of technological advancements in 
understanding directions.for future launch 
systems is a critical issue. Figure 5 
demonstrates now the gross lift-off weight of 
single- and two-stage vertical-takeoff rocket 
systems decrease with advancing technologies. 
The technology level parameter represents a 
percentage overall dry weight reduction from 
the Space Shuttle prior to vehicle resizing. 
Our baseline Shuttle II study considers a 
vehicle development cycle initiated in the 
year 1992 by which time all required 
technologies would need to be in place. This 
is at about the 25% dry weight reduction 
level. Highly advanced technologies, 
predicted for the National Aero-Space Plane, 
will require more intensive study to make them 
a reality. They are indicated as a 60% 
overall dry weight reduction over the Space 
Shuttle reference. 
The figure demonstrates that single-stage-to-
orbi t (SSTO) rocket vehicles become attractive 
only when the technology level achieves the 
equivalent of 30% - 40% dry weight reductions. 
Thus the defined near-term technology (1992) 
level suggests a two-stage rocket vehicle as 
the concept of choice. The outlook for 
single-stage rocket vehicles improves 
dramatically at advanced technology levels 
with the overall lift-off weights of both the 
single- and two-stage rocket vehicles under a 
million pounds. Operational considerations 
would then likely dictate the selection of the 
single-stage system. 
Vehicle dry weight is more closely aligned 
with overall development and production costs. 
In figure 6, near-term technology levels 
suggest selection of a two-stage rocket 
system. The logistics of moving a Shuttle II 
vehicle about is an important factor in the 
selection process. Considering the air-ferry 
weight-carrying capabilities of a 747 
transport aircraft, it is evident that both 
elements of a 1992-technology two-stage system 
are ferryable,·whereas the dry weight of the 
SSTO makes its ferry capability prohibitive. 
VEHICLE CONCEPTS 
Figure 7 provides a size comparison of the 
present Space Shuttle with the design concepts 
considered in the Shuttle II 'study. The 
single-stage-to-orbit concept using near-term 
technology is longer than the current Shuttle 
and weighs more. For polar missions, an 
augmentation stage must be added. The two-
stage vehicle, again employing near-term 
technologies, is significantly smaller and 
lighter. Baselined to perform the polar 
mission, it can carry 30,000 pounds to Space 
Station orbit. Most dramatic is the effect 
of applying advanced technology, as 
contemplated for National Aero-Space Plane 
use, to rocket vehicles. The SSTO rocket 
system is dramatically reduced in size and 
weight. 
Because of the large size and weight 
differences between the SSTO and two-stage 
concepts at a 1992 level of technology, the 
two-stage rocket system has been selected for 
further in-depth studies. Figure 8 is a 
multi-view of this vehicle. Figure 9 shows 
views of the orbiter and booster. 
The Shuttle II two-stage concept uses dual-
fuel, parallel-burn propulsion. At lift-off 
all engines on the booster and orbiter are 
running. The unmanned booster is powered by 
six liquid oxygen-hydrocarbon (RP) fuel 
engines rated at 250,000 pounds sea-level 
thrust. The booster has three propellant 
tanks (liquid hydrogen, liquid oxygen, RP 
fuel). Hydrogen and oxygen propellants are 
crossfed to the orbiter stage during the boost 
phase. Staging occurs at Mach 3 with the 
booster gliding back to the launch site. The 
low staging Mach number ensures no special 
booster thermal protection system requirements 
and allows significant performance and 
operations ~argins to be added without major 
system weight increases. 
The Shuttle II orbiter is propelled by five 
liquid oxygen-liquid hydrogen engines of 
300,000 pounds sea-level thrust each. These 
engines are based, in part, on the Space 
Shuttle Main Engine. Most of the orbiter body 
volume is occupied by the hydrogen and oxygen 
propellant tanks. At Mach 3 staging, these 
tanks are still full because of the crossfeed 
of propellants from the booster. 
Unlike the Space Shuttle, the orbiter concept 
uses a linearized crew module arrangement 
along the top of the fuel tanks. The forward 
flight compartment, with a crew complement of 
up to 5, is positioned such as to allow it to 
be rocketed free in an emergency escape. 
Behind the flight compartment is a work/sleep 
station comparable to the mid-deck of the 
Space Shuttle. An internal tunnel, covered by 
a fuselage fairing, connects the crew module 
to the payload containment structure. Many 
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subsystems are located, for easy access, in 
the forward nose area and spine fairing. 
As the orbiter accelerates towards orbital 
speed, three of the main.engines are throttled 
down and then switched off. Extendable 
nozzles on two of the engines are deployed to 
maximize engine thrust efficiency. 
Figure 1 O depicts the general operational 
scenario for this vehicle. Following a 
mission, servicing of the vehicle would be 
conducted horizontally in a low-bay facility. 
Booster, orbiter, and payload container would 
be processed in separate areas and brought 
together f.or vehi ale integration. The 
vehicle's unfueled weight is small enough to 
permit horizontal towing to the launch pad. A 
nominal ground turnaround time of ten days is 
an operational goal for this concept. 
At the launch pad, the vehicle is raised to 
the vertical with a strongback system, fueled 
and launched.· Pad time is reduced to 24 hours 
or less by dictating that nearly all vehicle 
preparatory functions occur in the processing 
facility. Only minimum vehicle maintenance or 
late payload access functions would be 
available at the launch pad. Because of 
highly volatile weather considerations, a 
rolling enclosure is provided for the time the 
vehicle is on the launch pad. 
TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS 
Certain critical technologies have been 
identified as requiring development before a 
next-generation vehicle enters its development 
cycle. Lightweight primary structures, both 
in material properties and methods of 
construction, are a driving factor in reducing 
the size of the vehicle. Space Shuttle 
experience suggests a Shuttle II vehicle have 
a thermal protection system (TPS) that is 
durable, waterproof, and significantly less 
labor-intensive. This would allow flight even 
in adverse weather. Reusable, cryogenic 
propellant tankage is an enabling technology 
for these concepts. In our studies, the 
tankage is integral and subject to major 
loadings. Yet these tanks must function for 
tens, perhaps hundreds of uses. Inspection 
procedures for demonstrating tank integrity 
are also critical. 
Reusable hydrocarbon and advanced hydrogen 
propulsion require technological development. 
In the area of operations, vehicle 
technologies related to the use of expert 
systems, robotics and artificial intelligence 
would decouple the vehicle from a majority of 
mission control functions, thus making it 
autonomous. Fault-tolerant and self-test 
systems are required to maintain the vehicle. 
PHASED APPROACH 
The Shuttle II concept shown would begin 
operations in the post-2000 time period. A 
phased approach is being considered for this 
system which could also provide a heavy-lift 
cargo function. In such a scenario, the 
Shuttle II booster and an unmanned parallel 
second stage are developed and flight tested 
by the late 1990's. The booster, as a 
consequence of the low staging Mach number, 
can initially be produced with large design 
margins, particularly in the area of reusable 
cryogenic tankage. Estimates are that a 
second stage, using hydrogen propulsion with 
crossfeed from the booster, could.deliver 
75,000 to 100,000 pounds to orbit. Initially 
the second stage might be entirely expendable, 
but later the propulsion and avionics package 
may be recovered from orbit for reuse. 
In the post-2000 time period, the manned 
orbiter stage would be phased in having 
benefited from several years' experience with 
similar unmanned systems. During the phase-in 
period of the Shuttle II system, the present 
Space Shuttle would continue to fulfill its 
transportation role, especially with regard to 
man-critical missions. 
SUMMARY 
In summary, a manned Shuttle II vehicle will 
form part of a future mixed-fleet 
transportation system. To acl;lieve low costs, 
a fully-reusable system with much simpler 
operations than the current Shuttle will be 
necessary. This requires innovative design 
concepts and operations strategies. A two-
stage rocket vehicle is the most likely 
candidate for a near-term Shuttle II 
development program. As various rocket-
vehicle technologies advance, we see the 
emergence of single-stage-to-orbit vehicles. 
Ve~y advanced technologies, as exemplified in 
the National Aero-Space Plane, will also 
dramatically improve the performance and 
operations of rocket vehicles. A number of 
critical technologies require funding now to 
ensure they are available when Shuttle II 
development begins. 
Current Shuttle II study efforts are refining 
the two-stage baseline d~slgn concept and 
defining a detailed operations scenario and 
cost estimate. This baseline concept will 
also form the basis of studies examining a 
mixed-fleet architecture approach to space 
transportation. 
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SPACE TRANSPORTATION ARCHITECTURE 
OPTIONS 
-
Need 
I 
Time ~ 
Technology ~ 
Priority/Sortie ~Shuttlell Missions 
• Low $/flight 
•Low $/lb I 
" I I ', 0, Cargo Missions ', 
·Low $/lb 
Complementary 
Figure 1.- Space transportation architecture options based on mission requirements. 
SHUTTLE II MISSIONS 
• People transport 
• Manned access to space station 
• Man-critical missions 
• Rescue 
• Manned exploration 
• Public access to space 
•, Servicing 
• Space station 
• Co-orbiting platforms 
• Polar platforms 
• Commercial platforms 
• Observatories 
• Other 
• Launch and recovery 
• Small payloads 
• Commercial products return to Earth 
• Other down payloads 
Figure 2.- Priority/sortie missions for a Shuttle II vehicle. 
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RECURRING COSTS 
SHUTTLE (STS) 
Hardware 
(includes 
expendables) 
51% 
Propellants 
4% 
Operations 
45% 
Hardware 
(refurbish, 
replace) 
SHUTTLE II 
Goal: Reduce recurring 
costs to a fraction 
of those of STS 
Inferences: Full reusability 
Simple operations 
Figure 3.- Reducing recurring costs of flying Shuttle missions. 
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DETACHABLE PAYLOAD CONTAINER SYSTEM 
• Offline processing 
• Standardized payload 
interfaces 
• Specialized container 
systems for dominant 
mission types 
• User access until 
installation at 
launch pad 
Deployment 
Servicing 
Personnel Transport 
Delivery 
Figure 4.- Containerized payload concept for streamlining ground operations. 
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TECHNOLOGY EFFECTS ON 
VERTICAL TAKE-OFF ROCKET VEHICLES 
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Dry weight reductions from STS, percent 
Figure· 5 .- Effects of technology advancements on gross lift-off weight (GLOW) 
of rocket vehicles. 
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TECHNOLOGY EFFECTS ON 
VERTICAL TAKE-OFF ROCKET VEHICLES 
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Figure 6.- Effects of technology advancements on dry weights of rocket vehicles. 
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Space 
Shuttle 
SHUTTLE II CONCEPTS COMPARED 
TO SPACE SHUTTLE 
Single Stage 
(SSTO) 
Near-Term 
Technology 
Two-Stage 
Near-Term 
Technology 
• Shutlle 11 carries 20 Klb 
• Payload Bay 15' x 30' 
Single-Stage 
(SSTO) 
Advanced 
Technology 
Figure 7 .- Several Shuttle II design concepts compared to the Space Shuttle. 
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SHUTTLE II TWO-STAGE CONCEPT 
110 ft 
• 1992 Technology level 
• Integral tanks 
• RP booster; Mach 3 staging glideback 
• LOX/LH2 orbiter 
• Payload: 12 Klb Polar . 
• Gross Weight: 2,036 Klb 
• Dry weight: 266 Klb 
Figu~e 8.- The Shuttle II baseline two-stage rocket vehicle. 
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ORBITER 
BOOSTER 
'Length: 138 ft 
Dry weight: 181 Klb 
GLOW: 1164 Klb 
Length: 1 06 ft 
Dry weight: 85 Klb 
GLOW: 872 Klb 
Figure 9.- Views of the Shuttle II orbiter and booster. 
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SHUTTLE II OPERATIONAL SCENARIO 
!!----=-
SERVICE 
SAFE SERVICE MATE LAUNCH 
Multiple bays Erect 
Figure 10.- General operational scenario for a Shuttle II vehicle. 
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